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The Internet industry has realized the importance of provision-
ing diﬀerent quality of service to diﬀerent applications. This paper
proposes the integrated diﬀerentiated services that achieves the eﬃ-
cient throughput allocation without signiﬁcant queue management or
real-time pricing costs. Competing diﬀerentiated services integrates
networks into a single network in an economy and allows endusers to
submit packets to many networks. In equilibrium, each network posts
any price for a submitted packet over time by virtue of the revenue
equivalence property.
1 Introduction
As the Internet has grown into a commercial reality, the number of endusers
and applications has expanded exponentially. At the beginning of the Inter-
net, ”Internet Services” meant basic electronic services such as ﬁle transfer,
electronic mail, or remote login. Today, ”Internet Services” refer various
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1applications including not only simple hypertext documents but also rich
media such as voice over IP (VoIP) and packetized video as well as person-
alized content in the form of Web portals provided from the World Wide
Web.1
As endusers use many diﬀerent applications in the Internet, the impor-
tance of provisioning diﬀerent quality of service to diﬀerent applications has
been recognized. This paper follows one of the most common approaches
(elastic traﬃc) in the literature that uses the enduser’s throughput at a time
as the measure of the quality of Internet service.2 For example, endusers
who use media content must have relatively more throughput for better and
quicker performance than do endusers who use simple applications such as
electronic mail or hypertext document.
Current IP networks however do not oﬀer easy ways to identify the use of
packets and subsequently give them special treatment. The original TCP/IP
protocol was built on the idea of equitable access to all endusers and no spe-
cial treatment for anyone.3 The internal operation of early routers used a
ﬁrst-in ﬁrst-out (FIFO) queuing strategy. If more packets arrived than the
router could handle and the queue ﬁlled up, newly arriving packets were just
dropped.
A couple of considerations should be in order in provisioning diﬀerent
quality of service. Pricing schemes and network architectures are not in-
dependent. Feasible pricing schemes are subject to a network architecture
adopted in the Internet industry. For example, the current pricing scheme is
the ﬁxed fee given an access time because the current network architecture
and TCP/IP protocol cannot guarantee diﬀerent throughputs to diﬀerent
endusers given the same access time.4 It implies that if some network archi-
1A packet is a data unit sent over a packet-switched network. IP is the Internet Protocol
that provides a connectionless best-eﬀort delivery service of datagrams across the Internet.
2See Shenker (1995) for the elastic traﬃc. A throughput measures the number of
packets transmitted through a network at a given time. When a network capacity is
measured in the number of packets that the network can transmit at a given time, the
term, ”throughput” is used in the computer science literature instead of bandwidth.
3TCP stands for the Transmission Control Protocol. It is a connection-oriented trans-
port protocol of the Internet architecture. TCP provides a reliable byte-stream delivery
service.
4For example, unlimited access for $20 a month and 100 hours for $10 a month. If a
network can assign diﬀerent bandwidth for diﬀerent endusers, then it is possible that given
100 hours, fast service (more bandwidth) for $15 a month and slow service for $10 a month.
There have been massive requests to change the current standard network architecture
2tecture and corresponding protocol are standardized, they will determine the
nature of competition in the Internet industry. On the other hand, although
some pricing scheme is appealing for the eﬃcient throughput allocation, it
can be quite costly to implement network architectures that support this
particular pricing scheme.
MacKie-Mason and Varian (1994, 1996) suggest in a descriptive way the
multiunit uniform-price auction in which endusers submit their bids for pack-
ets in real time and they pay transmitted packets at the price equal to the
highest bid among dropped packets.5 The auction approach is appealing in
the sense that it generates the eﬃcient throughput and the network supplier
does not need to change the price over time. However, it is quite costly
to adopt a network architecture to support the auction especially in high-
speed networks because it needs a signiﬁcant amount of time to calculate the
market-clearing price given many endusers’ bids in every instant.
The auction transmits packets at a router in the order of prices marked
in the headers of submitted packets in every instant so that it generates con-
tinuously diﬀerentiated service classes.6 In order to reduce the complicated
queue management and high calculation burden to derive the market-clearing
price in every instant, the scalable service classes has been proposed in the
computer science literature. It categorizes submitted packets at a router into
scalable service classes such as guaranteed, predictive, and best-oﬀer. Diﬀer-
ent service classes are treated diﬀerently (see David et al. (1998) and Korilis
and Lazar (1995)).
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) proposed the Diﬀerentiated
Services architecture on which scalable service classes can be built (see Blake
et al. (1998)).7 An important feature of the Diﬀerentiated Services archi-
by private network suppliers. Their requests must come from better opportunities for
proﬁt increase by changing the network architecture rather than from purely eﬃciency
consideration.
5Gupta et al. (1997) consider the situation where the network dynamically changes the
prices associated the diﬀerent service classes in order to track a socially optimal allocation.
This pricing scheme is theoretically appealing but expensive and complex to implement
as Marbach (2001) points out.
6A router is a network node connected to two or more networks that forwards packets
from one network to another.
7The Internet Engineering Task Force is a task force of the Internet Activity Board,
responsible for providing short-term engineering solutions for the Internet. The Internet
Activity Board is the main body that oversees the development and standardization of
protocols of the Internet architecture. The Diﬀerentiated Services architecture is quite
3tecture is that by aggregating a multitude of ﬂows into a small number of
classes, The Diﬀerentiated Services architecture eliminates the need to rec-
ognize and store information about each individual ﬂow at core routers and
it makes Diﬀerentiated Services scalable.
Computer scientists and engineers have implanted economics to see the
role of pricing scalable service classes that has been proposed in terms of tech-
nical architecture. Odlyzko (1999) and Orda and Shimkin (2000) construct
an economic model for scalable service classes. Fulp and Reeves (1998) and
Wang and Schulerine (2001) are more interested in constructing a billing
architecture to implement scalable service classes. In particular, Marbach
(2001) shows that scalable service classes can achieve the eﬃcient throughput
allocation that the auction generates to network suppliers in a competitive
market.
All these models focus on the endusers’ choice behavior assuming that
there exists a market-clearing price for each service class in every instant.
It is however the network suppliers who decide their prices for diﬀerent ser-
vice classes. In fact, the pricing scheme for scalable service classes is quite
complicated to implement. Networks adopting scalable service classes must
keep changing the prices for diﬀerent service classes in every instant even in
a very competitive environment because the number of endusers changes in
real time. Moreover, they need to keep track of the throughputs of diﬀerent
service classes for each enduser to decide payment.
One of the contributions of this paper is to show that there exists a pair
of a simple pricing scheme and a corresponding network architecture that
achieves the eﬃcient throughput allocation without signiﬁcant queue man-
agement and real-time pricing costs that scalable service classes or the mul-
tiunit uniform-price auction should bear. This paper proposes the integrated
diﬀerentiated services, based on the Diﬀerentiated Services architecture, in
the presence of ﬁnite network suppliers in an economy.
While scalable service classes or the multiunit uniform-price auction pro-
vide ways to oﬀer diﬀerent service classes within an individual network, they
restrict endusers to submit their packets and pay money to a single net-
work. The noble feature of the integrated diﬀerentiated services is that it
integrates networks into a single big network in an economy. Each individual
network provides a single service class possibly diﬀerent from ones provided
a general network architecture to provide diﬀerent quality of service by giving packets
special handling.
4by the other networks and posts a price for a submitted packet. Endusers can
submit their packets to many networks. A packet is passed to the network
marked on the packet header.
Each enduser faces the portfolio decision on the numbers of submitted
packets between networks. In each network, packets are dropped at a router
in proportion to the number of packets submitted by each enduser if the
number of submitted packets is greater than the number of packets that the
network can transmitted (the throughput of the network). If the number of
submitted packets is smaller than the throughput of the network, then the
numbers of transmitted packets for endusers are determined in proportion
to the number of packets submitted by each enduser. The total number of
packets submitted to a network determines the service class of the network,
which is characterized by the number of transmitted packets per submitted
packet. When endusers see prices for submitted packets that network suppli-
ers post, they can foresee the market-clearing price for a transmitted packet
and subsequently the unique aggregate submitted packets given the prices for
submitted packets across networks. In equilibrium, each enduser chooses the
portfolio such that her total throughput (the total number of her transmitted
packets through all networks) coincides with the eﬃcient throughput under
the multiunit uniform-price auction, so that there is no arbitrage opportunity
to endusers in equilibrium.
The most remarkable result is that the revenue equivalence property holds
in any equilibrium. Regardless of prices for submitted packets that net-
work suppliers post, endusers’ portfolio decision makes each enduser’s total
throughput the same as the eﬃcient one that would have been chosen under
the multiunit uniform-price auction. Each enduser’s payment is equal to the
one that she would have paid under the multiunit uniform-price auction. The
equilibrium revenue of a network is always the market-clearing price times
its throughput regardless of its price for a submitted packet. The revenue
equivalence property makes it possible for each network to maintain its price
for a submitted packet the same over time even if the number of endusers
diﬀers at diﬀerent times.
In contrast to the multiunit uniform-price auction, each network does not
need to worry about whose packets are transmitted at the router in order
to decide the payment since the payment is decided based on the number
of submitted packets but not on the number of the transmitted packets at
the router. Moreover, each network does not need to oﬀer many service
classes because the integrated diﬀerentiated services generates the same rev-
5enue that the scalable service classes would have generated. If any pricing
scheme is considered for provisioning diﬀerent quality of service, it should
be simple enough not to delay the transmission of packets. The equilibrium
price scheme described in this chapter ﬁts in with this consideration on the
top of the eﬃcient throughput allocation.
2 Preliminaries
It is assumed that time is discrete and consists of cycles. One cycle is a set
of consecutive discrete time slots, T = {1,··· ,T}. Consider a network with
its ﬁxed throughput k in each time slot t ∈ T . Suppose that c is the cost
of providing a network with the throughput k. For a moment, we assume
that each enduser accesses the Internet at a constant and deterministic rate
in each time slot of a cycle. It is called smooth traﬃc. We will allow bursty
traﬃc in section 3.4.2 where the measure of total endusers changes over time
slots.
There is a continuum of endusers on line whose types are parametrized by
θ ∈ Θ = [θ,θ]. A type can be thought of as an application that an enduser
uses in the Internet: for example, a simple email service, VoIP, packetized
video, and etc. The measure of endusers is characterized by G, so the measure
of endusers in a subset B ⊂ Θ is G(B). When the enduser of type θ accesses
the Internet in a time slot, the enduser’s payoﬀ in a time slot is
U(y,m,θ) = u(y,θ) − m (1)
where y is the enduser’s throughput (in other words, the number of her trans-
mitted packets in a time slot) and m is the money that she pays. We assume
that u is increasing in y. This utility function represents the enduser’s pref-
erences in the elastic traﬃc in which the enduser perceives the quality of
service as an increasing function of her throughput.8 Let u(y,θ) be the bene-
ﬁt of the internet service for the enduser of type θ when y is her throughput.
u is assumed to be bounded and twice continuously diﬀerentiable. u is also
assumed to be a strictly concave function with respect to y given θ ∈ Θ.
8The more packets get transmitted, the quicker an enduser can use an application. For
example, an enduser can watch a real-time movie without any buﬀering if a stream of
many packets keeps getting transmitted. This does not mean that a packet itself literally
moves more quickly. The speed of the transmission cannot be higher than the speed of
light.
6MacKie-Mason and Varian (1996) propose the multiunit uniform-price
auction for pricing the quality of service in computer networks and Cr´ emer
and Hariton (1999) examine MacKie-Mason and Varian’s idea. When the
network runs the multiunit uniform-price auction, each enduser submits her
demand function for packets. Let b b(p,θ) be the equilibrium demand function
submitted by the enduser of type θ. The network calculates the market-
clearing price b p(G,k) given demand functions submitted by endusers. It
then transmits packets from the one marked with the highest price to the
one marked with the market-clearing price in turn. All the packets marked
with prices lower than the market-clearing prices are dropped. In this way
the multiunit uniform-price auction generates continuous service classes. It
is important to note that the market-clearing price is the price for a trans-
mitted packet but not for a submitted packet. Endusers pay money only for
transmitted packets but not for their submitted packets.
The payment is the market-clearing price times the throughput. While
the multiunit uniform-price auction generates the eﬃcient throughput allo-
cation as MacKie-Mason and Varian shows, it is very costly to implement
auctions for pricing the packets. At any point in time, the network must cal-
culate the market-clearing price given submitted demand functions through
sorting out the demands from the one with the highest price. It takes the
network a signiﬁcant time to sort out the demand functions especially in
high-speed networks because the throughput is huge.
3 Diﬀerentiated Services Architecture
The Diﬀerentiated Services architecture is a network architecture for sup-
porting diﬀerent quality of service proposed by IETF. The key concept of
the Diﬀerentiated Services architecture is that individual host-to-host mi-
croﬂows are aggregated into a single larger aggregate ﬂow and then that
single aggregate ﬂow receives special treatment.
Currently the Diﬀerentiated Services architecture is being considered to
support scalable service classes within a network. It classiﬁes individual
microﬂows at the edge of the network into one of several unique service
classes (such as gold, silver, and bronze) and then applies a per-class service
in the middle of the network. The classiﬁcation is performed at the network
ingress based on an analysis of one or more ﬁelds in the packet. The packet
is then marked (turning on some code points, or bits, in the packet header)
7as belonging to a particular service class and then injected into the network.9
The core routers that forward the packet examine the DS code points (DSCP)
in the packet header to determine how the packet should be treated (for
example, what transmission queue the packet should be placed in).10
To accomplish this, the Diﬀerentiated Services architecture deﬁnes several
components. The DS-ﬁeld is a bit pattern contained in the header of each
packet that denotes the service (termed per-hop behavior) the packet should
receive at each hop as it is forwarded through the network.11 The per-hop
behavior (PHB) deﬁnes the service the packet receives at each hop as it
is forwarded through the network. A PHB may be expressed in relative
(compared to other PHBs) or absolute (such as bandwidth or delay) terms.
A behavior aggregate (BA) is a group of packets with the same DSCP. A
PHB is applied to each BA inside the network. The boundary router is
positioned at the edge of a DS-capable network. This device is responsible
for packet classiﬁcation, metering, marking, and possibly traﬃc conditioning
(such as policing or shaping).12
4 Integrated Diﬀerentiated Services
I proposes the integrated diﬀerentiated services based on the Diﬀerentiated
Service architecture, which is diﬀerent from scalable service classes proposed
in the computer science literature. There is a set of network suppliers,
I = {1,··· ,I}, in the economy. Each network in the economy employs
the Diﬀerentiated Services architecture. Even if an enduser’s computer is
physically connected to a single network, she can submit her packets to all
the networks in the economy by marking the identity of network in the packet
header. A PHB is therefore the identity of a network. While scalable service
classes diﬀerentiates service classes within a single network, the integrated
9Marking is the process of setting the DS codepoint in a packet based on deﬁned rules.
10A DS code point is a speciﬁc value of the DSCP portion of the DS ﬁeld, used to select
a PHB.
11A hop is a term used in routing. It is a path to a destination on a network is a series
of hops through routers away from the origin.
12Metering is the process of measuring the temporal properties (e.g. rate) of a traﬃc
stream selected by a classiﬁer. Polishing is the process of discarding packets within a
traﬃc stream in accordance with the state of a corresponding meter enforcing a traﬃc
proﬁle. Shaping is the process of delaying packets within a traﬃc stream to cause it to
conform to some deﬁned traﬃc proﬁle.
8diﬀerentiated services described in this section diﬀerentiates service classes
between networks such that a single network provides only one service class
possibly diﬀerent from the ones provided by the other networks.
Now I show how the integrated diﬀerentiated services works technically
in each network. The throughput of network i for each i ∈ I is ki. The cost
of providing a network with throughput ki is ci > 0. Suppose that zi(θ) be
the number of packets submitted to network i by the enduser of type θ in a
time slot for all θ ∈ Θ and all i ∈ I. Then, the total number of submitted











zi < 1, then only zi(θ)
ki
zi packets are transmitted for the enduser of type θ
and zi(θ)[1 −
ki
zi] packets are dropped. If
ki
zi ≥ 1, then again zi(θ)
ki
zi packets
are transmitted for the enduser of type θ, which is more than the number of
packets zi(θ) that the enduser of type θ submits.13







which means that the total throughput of all endusers in network i is the same
as the throughput of network i. If [z1,··· ,zI] is the array of the numbers
of packets submitted to all networks by the enduser of type θ, then the






Given the deﬁnition of the utility function, the beneﬁt of the internet service










13Note that a stream of packets travels in networks. Even if very few packets are
submitted at a router in the case of ki
zi ≥ 1, more packets can be transmitted instantly.
94.1 Smooth Traﬃc
Network suppliers’ pricing strategies and endusers’ purchase decisions are as
follows. First, network supplier i for each i ∈ I posts a price for a submitted
packet pi ∈ R+. Second, each enduser decides how many packets to submit to
which networks after seeing prices for submitted packets p = (p1,··· ,pI) ∈
RI
+ that network suppliers post.
A purchase decision is characterized by a mapping s : RI
+ × Θ → RI.
s(p,θ) = (s1(p,θ),··· ,sI(p,θ)) is an array of the numbers of packets sub-
mitted by the enduser of type θ when p = (p1,··· ,pI) is prices for submitted
packets that network suppliers post. Let xi(p,s) be the total number of pack-
ets submitted to network i when prices for submitted packets are p and the













Suppose that s is the purchase decision chosen by endusers. When prices
for submitted packets are p, the payoﬀ for the enduser of type θ is






























for every p ∈ RI
+ and every θ ∈ Θ, where (x1,··· ,xI) is the numbers of
submitted packets to all networks (xi is the number of packets submitted to
network i for all i ∈ I)
Suppose that network supplier i uses a pricing strategy pi ∈ R+ (a price
for a packet submitted to network i). Let p−i = (p1,··· ,pi−1,pi+1,··· ,pI).
Given a continuation equilibrium s∗, the payoﬀ for network supplier i ∈ I is
Π(pi,p−i,s
∗) = pixi(p,s
∗) − ci (6)
10where p = (p1,··· ,pI) ∈ RI
+.
An integrated diﬀerentiated services equilibrium is an array of pricing
strategies p∗ = (p∗
1,··· ,p∗
I) and a continuation equilibrium s∗ such that p∗
is a Nash equilibrium for the normal form game deﬁned by the continuation
equilibrium s∗.
First, we derive the necessary condition that should be satisﬁed in any
continuation equilibrium. This necessary condition is surprising because any
continuation equilibrium reproduces the equilibrium allocation that would
have been achieved under the multiunit uniform-price auction.
Theorem 1 In any continuation equilibrium s∗, the following conditions are
satisﬁed.

















































Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
Suppose that s∗ characterizes the endusers’ equilibrium purchase decision.
For every θ ∈ Θ, every p ∈ RI
+, s∗(p,θ) = (s∗
1(p,θ),··· ,s∗
I(p,θ)) must


















for every i ∈ I. The throughput of the enduser of type θ in network i is
s∗
i(p,θ)ki/xi(p,s∗). In equilibrium, the aggregate demanded throughput in




11ki for all i ∈ I. The price for a transmitted packet is pixi(p,s∗)/ki. Since it
is the price for a transmitted packet that clears the market in the economy, it














l=1 kl) is the market-clearing price when the measure of en-
dusers is G and the total throughput in the economy is
PI
l=1 kl. Under this
price for a transmitted packet, the total throughput of the enduser of type
θ is equal to the throughput she would have purchased under the multiunit







































where b b(b p(G,
PI
l=1 kl),θ) is the throughput she would have purchased under
the multiunit uniform-price auction. That is, the equilibrium payment is the
same as the payment that she would have made for b b(b p(G,
PI
l=1 kl),θ) under
the multiunit uniform-price auction. Therefore, every enduser will have the
same payoﬀ as she would obtain under the multiunit uniform-price auction.
Moreover, it is obvious from (10) that each network has the revenue that is
equal to its throughput times the market-clearing price no matter what price
for a submitted packet a network supplier posts: pixi(p,s∗) = b p(G,
PI
l=1 kl)ki
for all i ∈ I.
Given the price for a submitted packet that network i posts, the equilib-
rium aggregate submitted packets make the price for a transmitted packet
the same as the market-clearing price: the higher price for a submitted packet
a network supplier posts, the less packets are submitted. Therefore, there is
no arbitrage opportunity by choosing any particular network in equilibrium.
The equilibrium throughput allocation is eﬃcient since it is exactly the same
as the one under the multiunit uniform-price auction. The existence of equi-
libria is not yet addressed. Theorem 2 identiﬁes an integrated diﬀerentiated
services equilibrium.
12Theorem 2 (p∗,s∗) is an integrated diﬀerentiated services equilibrium if p∗
i
is any positive price for a submitted packet for every i ∈ I and s∗(p,θ) =
(s∗
1(p,θ),··· ,s∗
I(p,θ)) satisﬁes, for every p ∈RI

























Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
No matter what price for a submitted packet network i posts, its rev-
enue is always equal to b p(G,
PI
l=1 kl)ki in equilibrium. It is therefore obvi-
ous that each network supplier’s equilibrium pricing strategy is to post any
positive price for a submitted packet. To show the existence of an equi-
librium, we must ﬁnd the endusers’ equilibrium purchase decision and then
show the sum of endusers’ packets submitted to network i ∈ I is equal to
b p(G,
PI
l=1 kl)ki/pi. Suppose that the purchase decision is the one in theo-
rem 2. With this purchase decision, each enduser submits packets to net-




l=1 kl. Then the enduser’s total
throughput is equal to the throughput that she would have purchased under
the multiunit uniform-price auction as appendix 6.2 proves. It is straightfor-
ward to show that in fact integrating endusers’ packets submitted to network
i yields the aggregate number of submitted packets such that it makes the
price for a transmitted packet equal to the market-clearing price. There-
fore, (p∗,s∗) described in theorem 2 is an integrated diﬀerentiated services
equilibrium.
4.2 Bursty Traﬃc
The integrated diﬀerentiated services described in the previous section fo-
cuses on the smooth traﬃc where each enduser accesses the Internet at a
constant and deterministic rate. In practice, the measure of endusers who
access the Internet does vary over time slots. It is called bursty traﬃc. Traf-
ﬁc in the Internet can be very congested in some time slot relative to other
time slots. First, it is interesting to know whether or not the integrated dif-
ferentiated services can induce the eﬃcient throughput allocation in bursty
traﬃc. Second, we like to know whether or not there exists a pricing scheme
simple enough to avoid complicated queue management or high real-time
13pricing costs in bursty traﬃc. Following the approach of Marbach (2001),
we assume that in time slot t ∈ T , each enduser accesses the Internet with
probability qt and stays oﬀ line with probability 1 − qt. The value of qt for
all t ∈ T is public information. The measure of endusers on line whose type
belongs to a subset A ⊂ Θ is qtG(A). Therefore, the measure of endusers at
time slot t is qtG.
In each time slot, network suppliers post their prices for submitted pack-
ets. These prices can vary over time slots depending on network suppliers’
decisions. After seeing the prices for submitted packets that network sup-
pliers post in each time slot, endusers make purchase decisions on packets
submitted across networks when they access the Internet. It is quite straight-
forward to derive endusers’ equilibrium purchase decisions in each time slot.
In smooth traﬃc, endusers’ equilibrium purchase decision is the same over
time slots because the measure of endusers on line is constant. While the
measure of endusers on line varies over time slots, endusers can forecast the
changes systematically because they know how heavy the traﬃc, qtG, is in
each time slot.
In each time slot t ∈ T , every enduser can base her equilibrium purchase
decision on the decision rules described in theorem 2 by replacing the mea-
sure of endusers on line with qtG in each time slot t ∈ T . Each enduser’s
equilibrium purchase decision follows, for every t ∈ T , every θ ∈ Θ, and


























where pt = (p1t,··· ,pIt) is the prices for submitted packets that network
suppliers post in time slot t and s∗
it(pt,θ) is the number of packets submitted
to network i by the enduser of type θ in time slot t.
The network suppliers should decide pricing strategies on how to decide
the price for a submitted packet over time slots. The revenue equivalence
property makes it possible for network suppliers to post the same price for a
submitted packet over time slots in equilibrium as theorem 3 proves.
Theorem 3 In equilibrium, network suppliers do not need to change their
prices for submitted packets over time slots.
Proof. See Appendix 6.3.
14Given prices for submitted packets, it is the endusers’ purchase decision
that makes the price for a transmitted packet the same as the market-clearing
price in every time slot. Since any price for a submitted packet is an equilib-
rium price for a submitted packet in any time slot by theorem 2, the network
suppliers do not need to change their prices for submitted packets over time
slots.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes an alternative selling mechanism for the auction in a
highly dynamic environment in which the object is multiunit and its dilivery
time characteriszes its quality. When endusers perceive quality of the object
as how quckly the object can be delivered, the auction leaves a signiﬁcant
pricing burden with the networks because it takes a signiﬁcant amount of
time to calculate the equilibrium price given instant bids.
The integrated diﬀerentiated services alleviates the network’s burden of
queue management by letting endusers decide the price for a transmitted
packet. Networks do not need to change prices for submitted packets because
of the revenue equivalence property. The environment in the Internet is quite
complicated in the sense that there are many endusers accessing the Internet
at the same time and the number of endusers who access the Internet changes
over time even during a day. The transmission time in the Internet is just
few seconds or usually less than a second. Especially, the network with high
speed has a lot shorter transmission time. If any pricing scheme is considered
for provisioning diﬀerent quality of service, it should be simple enough not
to delay the transmission of packets. The equilibrium prices described in
this paper ﬁts in this consideration on the top of the eﬃcient throughput
allocation in the sense that each network supplier posts any positive price
and does not need to change it over time.
The integrated diﬀerentiated services allows the enduser to submit pack-
ets and pay money to many diﬀerent networks. Even though networks do not
have diﬀerent service classes, posting diﬀerent prices for submitted packets
yields the diﬀerent throughput per submitted packet across networks in the
economy. Since the Diﬀerentiated Service architecture can integrate the net-
works in the economy into a single network and the individual networks pro-
vide diﬀerent service classes by posting diﬀerent prices for submitted prices,
endusers can choose many diﬀerent networks to submit their packets.
15A network architecture restricts the set of available pricing schemes.
Therefore, it is very important to come up with a network architecture that
can provide an easy implementation of a pricing scheme and the eﬃcient
throughput allocation over time. The integrates diﬀerentiated services pro-
posed in this chapter satisﬁes this double object.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose that s∗ is the equilibrium purchase decision for endusers. For every
θ ∈ Θ, every p ∈ RI
+, s∗(p,θ) = (s∗
1(p,θ),··· ,s∗
I(p,θ)) satisﬁes (5). The
ﬁrst-order condition is, for all i ∈ I, all p ∈ RI


































The second-order condition is satisﬁed because of the concavity assump-
tion on u with respect to y given θ ∈ Θ. The throughput of the enduser of
type θ in the network i is s∗
i(p,θ)ki/xi(p,s∗) when the prices for submitted
packets are p. In equilibrium, the aggregate demanded throughput in each








dG = ki (16)
Since the right-hand side of (15) is the price for a transmitted packet, it















l=1 kl) is the market-clearing price when the measure of en-
dusers is G and the total throughput in the economy is
PI
l=1 kl. Under the
16price for a transmitted packet, the throughput of the enduser of type θ is































































































The ﬁrst equality comes from the deﬁnition of the equilibrium purchase de-
cision and the second equality comes from (18). From (17),
















































The equilibrium payment is the same as the payment that she would have
made for b b(b p(G,
PI
l=1 kl),θ) under the multiunit uniform-price auction. The
third equality in (19) comes from (21).
From (17),
pixi(p,s








for every i ∈ I. It says that the revenue of the network i with any price for a
submitted packet pi ∈ R+ is always equal to the revenue that he would have
got under the multiunit uniform-price auction.
176.2 Proof of Theorem 2
No matter what price for a submitted packet a network supplier posts, his
revenue is always equal to b p(G,
PI
l=1 kl)ki in equilibrium. It is therefore
obvious that each network supplier’s equilibrium pricing strategy is to post
any positive price for a submitted packet. From (17), we know the aggregate












To show the existence of an equilibrium, we must ﬁnd the endusers’ equilib-
rium purchase decision and then show the sum of individual packets submit-



















































































































So, it is equal to the throughput that she would have purchased under the
multiunit uniform-price auction. s∗(p,θ) = (s∗
1(p,θ),··· ,s∗
I(p,θ)) satisﬁes
the ﬁrst-order condition in (15). Therefore, it is the enduser’s equilibrium
18purchase decision. To get the aggregate packets submitted to network i, we














































































This is equal to the aggregate submitted packets derived from (17). There-
fore, (p∗,s∗) described in theorem 2 is an integrated diﬀerentiated services
equilibrium.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose that the prices for submitted packets that network suppliers are pt
in time slot t. In time slot t, the equilibrium price for a transmitted packet














t) is the aggregate number of packets submitted to the network
i in time slot t. Given the prices for submitted prices, the individual pur-
chase decision makes aggregate packets submitted to network i equalize the
price for a transmitted packet to the market-clearing price under the mul-
tiunit uniform-price auction. Since any price for a submitted packet is an
equilibrium price for a submitted price for each network i in any given time
slot by theorem 2, the network suppliers do not need to change their prices
for submitted packets over time slots.
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